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Abstract 
Terrorist groups are currently using information and communication technologies (ICTs) to orchestrate their 
conventional physical attacks. More recently, terrorists have been developing a new form of capability within the 
cyber-arena to coordinate cyber-based attacks. This paper identifies that cyber-terrorism capabilities are an 
integral, imperative, yet under-researched component in establishing, and enhancing cyber-terrorism risk 
assessment models for SCADA systems. This paper is an extension of work previously published by Beggs and 
Warren 2008, it presents a high level overview of a cyber-terrorism SCADA risk framework that has been adopted 
and validated by SCADA industry practitioners. The paper proposes a managerial framework which is designed to 
measure and protect SCADA systems from the threat of cyber-terrorism within Australia. The findings and results of 
an industry focus group are presented in support of the developed framework for SCADA industry adoption and 
acceptance.   
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INTRODUCTION  
Cyber-terrorism is “non-state actors’ use of ICTs to attack and control critical information systems with political 
motivation and the intent to cause harm and spread fear to people or at least with the anticipation of changing 
domestic, national or international events” (Beggs, 2005).  For example, an individual who has political motive and 
penetrates a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system controlling gas pressure in a gas plant by 
manipulating the pipeline and causing an explosion would be classified as cyber-terrorism, because bystanders and 
civilians would be harmed and motivation to effect political change would have occurred.   
 
SCADA systems have evolved since the 1960s from stand alone systems to networked architectures that 
communicate across large distances. Their implementation has migrated from custom hardware and software to 
standard hardware and software platforms (Krutz, 2006). SCADA systems form part of Australia’s critical 
infrastructure. They are used to remotely monitor and control the delivery of essential services and products, such as 
electricity, gas, water, waste treatment and transport systems (TISN, 2008) The need for security measures within 
these systems was not anticipated in the early development stages as they were designed to be closed systems and 
not open systems such as the Internet. The increasingly networked and linked infrastructure of modern SCADA 
systems has changed those early security plans. Utilities in the industrial control sector have integrated these 
SCADA networks with their business networks which unfortunately has exposed them to a series of vulnerabilities 
and risks (Internet Security Systems, 2005).  
 
Currently, organisations within Australia that are controlling critical infrastructure systems such as SCADA are now 
vulnerable to cyber-terrorism. Attacks and cases in recent years such as the Polish Tram System 2008, Estonia 2007, 
SQL Slammer 2003, Queensland 2000 and Gazprom 1999, (See Appendix for descriptions) as well as many others, 
highlight the vulnerability in critical infrastructures and serve to highlight the possibility of cyber-terrorism 
occurring. These cases and attacks have prompted further research and investigation into the cyber-terrorism threat 
as research gaps have been recognised by the authors when conducting a literature review on the topic and by 
interviewing experts in the field. Some of the major gaps identified were the elements of SCADA security risk 
assessment, terrorist groups’ cyber-capability and SCADA critical infrastructure protection including SCADA 
system vulnerabilities. 
 
For non state actors (Cyber-terrorism group) to be a threat against a SCADA system requires a terrorist or group to 
have a high level of malicious intent and a high level of knowledge of SCADA systems and ICTs. This paper 
presents a framework that has been developed to measure and protect SCADA systems from the threat of cyber-
terrorism within Australia. The paper also examines the findings and results of a SCADA industry focus group that 
has been conducted in order to validate the cyber-terrorism SCADA risk framework for industry adoption and 
acceptance. 
 
CYBER-TERRORISM SCADA RISK FRAMEWORK  
A cyber-terrorism SCADA risk framework was developed and adopted to suit a SCADA environment. The 
framework involves a three stage process which organisations need to follow to measure and protect SCADA 
systems from the threat of cyber-terrorism. The results and findings of a SCADA industry focus group is presented 
later in support of the frameworks worthiness, acceptance and adoption within an industry based context.  
 
The process for organisations involves three stages which are listed below: 
 Stage 1- AS/NZS 4360: Cyber-terrorism SCADA Risk Assessment-(Subset);    
 Stage 2- Cyber-terrorism SCADA Capability Assessment Model; 
 Stage 3- AS/NZS 27002:2006 Cyber-terrorism-SCADA Controls-(Subset).   
The paper will describe the key stages of the framework. 
STAGE 1 AS/NZS 4360:2004 CYBER-TERRORISM SCADA RISK ASSESSMENT 
SUBSET  
The cyber-terrorism SCADA risk assessment subset represents the first stage process in measuring and protecting 
SCADA systems from the threat of cyber-terrorism within Australia. The subset has been adopted for a SCADA 
environment and discusses the various steps that should be used to conduct a risk assessment on a SCADA system. 
These steps have been derived and aligned with the procedures documented in the AS/NZS 4360:2004 risk 
management standard (Based upon Standards Australia, 2004). Some of the procedures and steps for conducting a 
risk assessment have been customised to fit a generic SCADA risk assessment and some stages within the process 
have been modified to suit the SCADA environment. This subset only provides a baseline (high-level) security risk 
assessment process that is applicable for SCADA systems. Organisations can use this subset and modify it to suit 
their SCADA configuration and their organisation requirements and needs (See Beggs and Warren 2008 for further 
details of stage 1).    
 
The key areas that are mentioned in this subset are the main elements of the risk management processes for a 
SCADA system which include: 
 Communicate and consult SCADA; 
 Establish the context  for SCADA; 
 Identify risks of SCADA; 
 Analyse risks of SCADA; 
 Evaluate risks of SCADA; 
 Treat risks for SCADA; 
 Monitor and review SCADA.  
(Based upon Standards Australia, 2004) 
 
STAGE 2 OF CYBER-TERRORISM SCADA RISK FRAMEWORK: CYBER-
TERRORISM SCADA CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT MODEL 
The second stage of the cyber-terrorism SCADA risk framework is the cyber-terrorism SCADA capability 
assessment model. This assessment model examines and analyses the level and identifies the indicators of cyber-
capability terrorist groups need to acquire to orchestrate cyber-terrorism. The assessment model consists of a cyber-
terrorism SCADA capability model which demonstrates eight indicator levels of cyber-capability a group would 
require to carry out a cyber-terrorist attack against SCADA systems within Australia. This capability model can be 
used by organisations as a tool to measure the level of cyber-capability terrorist groups possess.  The assessment 
model consists of guidelines and procedures on how to use the capability model and provides organisations with a 
tool to measure terrorist group’s cyber-capability to orchestrate cyber-terrorism. These tools are described in Table 1 
and Table 2.  
 
The model which has been developed by the present authors should be used as the second major step in measuring 
and protecting SCADA systems from the threat of cyber-terrorism within Australia.  
 
  
 Table 1. Terrorist Motive to Orchestrate Cyber-terrorism-Validated  
 
Terrorist Motive Required for a Cyber-terrorist Attack in Australia Indicator 
Political/Motivation- For an individual terrorist or group to orchestrate a 
cyber-terrorist attack against Australia they initially would need to have 
acquired a very high level (e.g. equivalent score of 5) of anti-Australian 
sentiment with political motivation to spread their ideology or to generate 
change by creating fear through an attack using or targeting ICT.   
Yes/No 
 
                                  Table 2. Cyber-terrorism SCADA Capability Model- Validated 
 
Terrorist Cyber-Capability Level Indicators  Required for a Cyber-
terrorist Attack in Australia 
Score 
Range 
Terrorist leaders and members with advanced ICT skill set- This level 
capability indicator requires terrorist leaders to have advanced knowledge of 
ICT including: TCP/IP, advanced cryptography, Botnets, Biometrics, and other 
associated security technologies.   
1-5 
Terrorists with advanced hacking tools and techniques- This capability level 
indicator would require education in ICTs and software training e.g. hacking 
tools and hardware to orchestrate an attack.   
1-5 
Access to new advanced ICTs- This capability level indicator involves 
terrorists or groups having access to new emerging technologies. E.g. 
biometrics, advanced encryption.   
1-5 
Advanced knowledge of SCADA systems- This capability level indicator 
involves terrorists having a high level of SCADA knowledge including; 
software engineering, middleware, application layer and backend.   
1-5 
Terrorist insiders within the organisation of selected target- this capability 
level indicator involves having a terrorist or member inside a critical 
infrastructure organisation such as power, gas, water etc, either within their IT 
department or operational control department.  
1-5 
Reconnaissance- this capability level indicator requires scanning and probing 
SCADA networks to find and detect SCADA vulnerabilities in order to prepare 
for attack.  
1-5 
Funding- this capability level indicator requires financial backing within the 
group to orchestrate attacks. This includes equipment, training, hiring, planning, 
organising, educating, etc.  
1-5 




CAPABILITY MODEL METHODOLOGY AND GUIDELINES FOR ORGANISATIONS 
The proposed model has been developed and is based on supporting literature and case studies such as Queensland 
2000, SQL Slammer 2003, and Gazprom 1999 (See Appendix for case details). The model is a guide for measuring 
a terrorist group’s cyber-capability for coordinating a cyber-terrorist attack against SCADA systems within 
Australia. Currently, there is no evidence of a cyber-terrorist attack being recorded or occurring within the 
Australian context or overseas. Consequently, it is difficult to predict the capability required for such an attack.  
 
It would only be possible to determine whether a terrorist group possesses advanced SCADA capability or advanced 
hacking techniques if it has previously demonstrated its cyber-capabilities in some way. Hence senior security 
managers may have to make some evaluations of cyber-capabilities based on how other terrorist groups, hackers and 
extremist groups have used ICT. Therefore, while the model includes hypothetical elements, it is grounded in 
concrete examples of how anti-social elements have used ICTs to advance their agendas or to cause destruction, 
including instances of harming individuals or attacking critical infrastructures.  
 
For instance, if a terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda has demonstrated all capability levels, then its cyber-terrorism 
SCADA capability level would be very high and the possibility that it could conduct a cyber attack would be more 
likely. Therefore, the model presents a foundation to measure and to estimate the cyber-capability of terrorist groups 
depending on the available information at hand.  
 
The model consists of eight indicator levels of cyber-capability to orchestrate a cyber-terrorist attack. The first level 
indicator political motivation must be either non-mandatory or mandatory with either a Yes/No as the political 
motivation capability level must automatically receive a score of 5 (very high) for it to be classified as an act of 
terrorism in order to start the cyber-terrorism lifecycle. All other seven capability levels are equally important and 
are mutually exclusive. Therefore they have same weighting and importance. For a terrorist group to have the 
maximum chance of orchestrating an attack, all cyber-capability level indicators need to be obtained with the highest 
scores possible 35/35. For example, if a group’s capability only involves four out of the eight capability levels with 
medium scores of 3 in each capability level (16/35), then a group’s likelihood of such an attack would be minimal. 
However, the more capability levels that are obtained will ultimately increase the likelihood of the group having the 
ability to orchestrate an attack. Another example could consist of a terrorist group obtaining six out of the eight 
capability levels with very high (5) scores e.g. 30/35. Although all levels have not been obtained, their chances 
would be increased. It is important to acknowledge that all capability level indicators should be valued equally since 
defining and measuring the relative importance of each capability level indicator is not quantifiable. For example, if 
a terrorist group has advanced knowledge of SCADA, but minimal knowledge of hacking, then penetrating a 
SCADA system would be near impossible. Similarly, if a terrorist group acquired advanced hacking techniques but 
had limited funding (e.g. laptops, software, training, planning, organising) then successfully orchestrating an attack 
would be also difficult. This suggests that it is not a viable option to evaluate and measure which capability level is 
more important than another and recommends that all capability levels have an important role in orchestrating a 
cyber-terrorist attack.    
 
Examples of Cyber-terrorism Capability Scores 
One of the issues relating to terrorist groups is that they have varying capabilities. The variability is described by 
Table 3, this shows the score range for each capability level. This score range indicated below is an example of how 
the cyber-terrorism SCADA capability model could be used by an organisation. This score has been derived based 
on a sample range of 1-5 but could be flexible and adaptable to change depending on the organisations needs and 
requirements.   
Table 3. Cyber-terrorism Scoring Matrix  
 
Score Range Description 
1  Very Low Terrorist group has developed or acquired very low capability if 
any;  
2 Low Terrorist group has developed or acquired a low level of 
capability; 
3 Medium Terrorist group has developed or acquired a medium level of 
capability; 
4 High Terrorist group has developed or acquired and demonstrated a 













GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES FOR ORGANISATIONS  
Organisations should use external cyber-terrorism experts in this stage of the framework to assist in the examination 
of terrorist groups’ cyber-capability to orchestrate a cyber-terrorist attack against their organisation and Australia. 
These experts should be outsourced from specialised security agencies, both government and private and should 
form the basis of a cyber-terrorism steering group who will have the knowledge and expertise on terrorist groups 
and their cyber-capabilities. The use of experts from trusted agencies such as ASIO, Defence Signal Directorate, 
TISN, Attorney Generals Department, Defence Department, Universities and other associated agencies would 
enable a wide range of experts to assist with estimating and assessing scores increasing the validity of the scores.    
 
The capability model requires cyber-terrorism experts to analyse the different indicator levels of capability required 
to orchestrate a cyber-terrorist attack. Organisations should seek advice from these experts in regards to their risk 
category and threat level of a cyber-terrorist attack against SCADA systems within Australia. Organisations should 
review these capability indicator levels regularly by appointing the necessary cyber-terrorism expertise from chosen 
security professionals or security agencies. For example, organisations should create communication channels with 
security professionals and agencies to develop a group of experts who can make an assessment on the capability and 
the threat of terrorist groups. Professionals or agencies could be developed from agencies discussed above.     
 
Cyber-terrorism experts should apply their expertise and knowledge of a terrorist group’s cyber-capability indicator 
levels to evaluate the cyber-terrorism SCADA capability model. This can be achieved by completing a cyber-
terrorism capability questionnaire for example which provides methods for data gathering to evaluate the level of 
cyber-capability terrorist groups possess (which is beyond the scope of this paper). Once the questionnaire is 
completed, organisations can assess a terrorist group’s cyber-capability levels by analysing the results from all the 
experts who have participated in the survey. The results should be analysed by taking the average mean of all 
experts’ opinions and responses. These results can than determine the level of cyber-capability terrorist group’s 
posses and can be used to evaluate the likelihood of a cyber-terrorist attack against SCADA systems within 
Australia. This suggests that the example of a questionnaire only provides a basis for making an assessment and 
other methods could be developed by the cyber-terrorism steering group depending on the needs and requirements 
of the organisation. For example, using previous cases and literature could be a possible method that organisations 
adopt in order to make an assessment for the cyber-terrorism SCADA capability model.   
 
Cyber-terrorism SCADA Capability Model Applied To Queensland Case 2000  
The cyber-terrorism SCADA capability model could also be applied to previous cases such as the Queensland case 
2000 (See Appendix). Although this case is not classified as cyber-terrorism by strict definition, this case is closely 
related and can also demonstrate how the cyber-terrorism SCADA capability model could be used to determine 
other threats to critical infrastructure and ICT. The case and cyber-capability indicators have been broken down and 
analysed by the present authors with discussion below:  
 
 Political Motivation: there was very low political motivation (if any) and intent for the employee to spread 
their ideology or to generate change by creating fear through an attack using or targeting ICT.   The case 
5 Very High Terrorist group has developed or acquired and demonstrated a 
very high level of capability.   
presented minimal signs of political motivation as the attacker was just a disgruntled employee seeking 
revenge about being refuted a  job position;  
 Advanced ICT Skill Set: a high level of ICT skill set was demonstrated by the attacker such as TCP/IP 
connections and bypassing security related technologies even if they were present which is restricted 
information and unknown. 
 Hacking tools and Techniques: was highly demonstrated in this case as he had full control of the SCADA 
systems and was able to release raw sewerage over a 4 month period. The hacker was directly connecting 
into the system as a mobile pump station (142 Sewage Pumps, 2 monitoring Computers and 3 Radio 
Frequencies). Security mechanisms were not properly in place for remote access and the SCADA network 
was not configured properly with firewall protection between SCADA the network and the corporate 
network. Also the laptop found had evidence of other hacking attempts 
 Advanced Knowledge of SCADA: the attacker had a very high level knowledge of SCADA systems as he 
was already working for Hunter WaterTech prior to the incident as a SCADA consultant;  
 Insider: the attacker was an insider of Hunter WaterTech a client of Maroochydore Water Services and was 
able to use information as well as a laptop from Hunter WaterTech to orchestrate his attacks against 
Maroochydore Water Services. This suggests that the attacker was a very high level insider between both 
organisations, who had the ability to carry out such an attack as he had previous knowledge and insight of 
the sewerage system;    
 Reconnaissance: this was most likely very low as he already had knowledge of the current system through 
Hunter WaterTech so scanning SCADA networks may have been unnecessary or limited in this case.   
 Funding: this was low because he had already stolen the software and the laptop from Hunter WaterTech. 
So there was no real need for funding in terms of equipment, training and education as this would have 
already been acquired and because of his previous SCADA experience and knowledge. 
 
The present authors have evaluated this case based on the information from the IT Security Expert Advisory Group, 
(2005) and have derived a score using the capability model (as shown by Table 4 & 5).  
 
Table 4. Terrorist Motive to Orchestrate Cyber-terrorism-Validated 
 
Terrorist Motive Required for a Cyber-terrorist Attack in Australia Indicator 
Political/Motivation- For an individual terrorist or group to orchestrate a cyber-
terrorist attack against Australia they initially would need to have acquired a very 
high level (e.g. equivalent score of 5) of anti-Australian sentiment with political 
motivation to spread their ideology or to generate change by creating fear 
through an attack using or targeting ICT.   
No 
 
                                  
  
Table 5. Cyber-terrorism SCADA Capability Mode -Validated 
 
Terrorist Cyber-Capability Level Indicators  Required for a Cyber-terrorist 
Attack in Australia 
Score 
Range 
Terrorist leaders and members with advanced ICT skill set- This level 
capability indicator requires terrorist leaders to have advanced knowledge of ICT 
including: TCP/IP, advanced cryptography, Botnets, Biometrics, and other 
associated security technologies.   
4 
Terrorists with advanced hacking tools and techniques- This capability level 
indicator would require education in ICTs and software training e.g. hacking tools 
and hardware to orchestrate an attack.   
4 
Access to new advanced ICTs- This capability level indicator involves terrorists 
or groups having access to new emerging technologies. E.g. biometrics, advanced 
encryption.   
4 
Advanced knowledge of SCADA systems- This capability level indicator 
involves terrorists having a high level of SCADA knowledge including; software 
engineering, middleware, application layer and backend.   
5 
Terrorist insiders within the organisation of selected target- this capability 
level indicator involves having a terrorist or member inside a critical 
infrastructure organisation such as power, gas, water etc, either within their IT 
department or operational control department.  
5 
Reconnaissance- this capability level indicator requires scanning and probing 
SCADA networks to find and detect SCADA vulnerabilities in order to prepare 
for attack.  
1 
Funding- this capability level indicator requires financial backing within the 
group to orchestrate attacks. This includes equipment, training, hiring, planning, 
organising, educating, etc.  
2 
Total Level of Cyber-Capability Indicators  Score 
=25/40 
 
The score indicated from the Queensland case 2000 demonstrates how the model can be used for existing or future 
related cases in relation to cyber-terrorism.   
STAGE 3 AS/NZS 27002:2006 CYBER-TERRORISM SCADA CONTROLS SUBSET  
The AS/NZS 27002: 2006 cyber-terrorism SCADA controls subset is the final stage in the cyber-terrorism SCADA 
risk framework and has also adopted an existing risk standard approach for a SCADA environment. This subset 
provides the necessary controls which are required to reduce the vulnerability of an attack against an organisation’s 
SCADA system.  This subset (which is beyond the scope of this paper) presents the stages and the controls that are 
required to protect organisations from cyber-terrorism and gives organisations a baseline (low-level) methodology 
for reducing SCADA security threats.  
 
The AS/NZS 27002:2006 cyber-terrorism SCADA controls subset has been based on the AS/NZS 27002:2006 risk 
standard and has been customised and modified to suit a generic SCADA environment (Standards Australia, 2006). 
The objectives and controls are to be implemented to meet the requirements identified in the first stage of the cyber-
terrorism SCADA risk assessment subset. These controls will help reduce those risks which are identified in the 
cyber-terrorism risk assessment subset and provide a high level methodology to mitigate the threat of cyber-
terrorism against SCADA systems within Australia.     
 
The cyber-terrorism SCADA controls subset contains 11 security control clauses which are listed below. These 
clauses provide a generic methodology to reduce the risks which are identified in Stage 1 of the cyber-terrorism 
SCADA risk framework. Figure 1 describes the 11 clauses within this standard (See Beggs and Warren 2008 for 
further details of stage 3): 
 
 
Figure 1 SCADA Controls to Reduce the Threat of Cyber-terrorism (Based upon Standards Australia, 2006) 
 
INDUSTRY ADOPTION AND ACCEPTANCE FOCUS GROUP VALIDATION AND 
EXAMINATION  
The framework presented above has been validated by a SCADA industry focus group. The results and findings 
from the focus group are discussed below providing further data in order to validate the frameworks’ importance and 
significance within an industry based context (See Beggs and Warren 2008 for additional focus group validation 
and results).    
 
Industry Focus Group Aim and Purpose  
The focus group involved 5 participants from a SCADA “Tier 1 Top 5” engineering consulting company who 
contributed to the focus group in order to provide feedback and data on how widely the framework could be used 
within in industry and how the consulting company could use the framework to assist their clients who are owners 
and operators of SCADA systems within critical infrastructures.  
 
SCADA Security Policy 
SCADA Physical and Environmental Security 
SCADA Organisation Information Security 
SCADA Asset Management 
SCADA Human Resources Security 
SCADA Communications and Operations Management 
SCADA Access Control 
SCADA Information Systems Acquisition, Development and Maintenance 
SCADA Information Security Incident Management 
SCADA Business Continuity Management 
SCADA Compliance 
Participant “A” was a certified security risk practitioner who had several years experience within the security 
industry. This participant had worked on various security projects within the critical infrastructure arena and has 
specialised certifications, accreditation and qualifications of risk standards. Participant “A” had extensive experience 
in conducting risk assessments and security audits as well as implementing and developing security policy. 
Participant “B” was a SCADA control systems engineer who had previous experience working with SCADA 
systems including SCADA system design, SCADA architecture and SCADA implementation across many different 
industry sectors. This participant was a senior SCADA expert in the field who had been involved in various SCADA 
projects in recent years within Australia and overseas. Participant “C” was another senior SCADA engineer who had 
worked previously for various SCADA vendors developing SCADA software and hardware. This participant had 
advanced knowledge of SCADA equipment and applications and had been designing and implementing SCADA 
systems for several years. Participant “D” was another senior SCADA control systems engineer who had worked on 
numerous SCADA projects within multiple critical infrastructure sectors.  This participant had over 20 years 
experience with industrial control systems including SCADA and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC’s) and 
Distributed Control Systems (DCS) systems. Participant “E” was a junior control systems engineer who has 
experience in designing SCADA HMI screens and SCADA applications for industrial controls systems. This 
participant had a very high level knowledge of engineering coding and programming skills for customised SCADA 
applications for many different SCADA sectors.   
 
Focus Group Study Theme  
The focus group involved an experienced facilitator who assisted in moderating the discussion between all 
participants. The focus group presented a cyber-terrorism SCADA attack scenario which established the significance 
as well as the usability of the framework and its overall contribution to the research area. The focus group’s aim was 
to collect data based around these discussion questions:  
 Does the framework follow a process that organisations could easily adapt to measure and protect against 
the threat of cyber-terrorism to SCADA? 
 How widely would SCADA asset owners, SCADA engineers or industry practitioners use the framework 
presented? 
 If you are a SCADA asset owner or SCADA engineer and you needed to evaluate the likelihood of cyber-
terrorism occurring against your SCADA system. How widely would you use the Cyber-terrorism SCADA 
Capability Assessment Model (Stage 2) of framework to measure this likelihood? 
 Would there be any industry implications when using or adopting the framework? 
 
Industry Focus Groups Findings and Results  
The discussion and findings is based on how widely industry would adopt the cyber-terrorism SCADA risk 
framework. Participant “B” suggested that the “framework follows a process that addresses vulnerability”. This 
participant believed that the proposed framework provides a “formal approach at identifying risks against SCADA.” 
Participant “B” argued “that there is a need for a framework for SCADA engineers and consultants when identifying 
SCADA risks” such as cyber-terrorism. Such comments suggest that the framework has a valid purpose and can be 
of value to the SCADA community. Participant “B” argued that in the “past SCADA consultants have not followed 
a comprehensive approach in assessing these types of threats.” Participant “B” claimed that with “previous risk 
assessments workshops” the participant had been involved in that “no formal approach was being used for 
SCADA.” This participant gave an example regarding “regular password changes when employees leave the utility 
who are SCADA users.” The participants claimed that “these types of processes were not readily adopted at plant 
sites that he had been involved in.” Participant “B” suggested that the framework “provides a process that would 
encourage SCADA consultants to be more security aware and would enable them to perform a comprehensive and 
detailed risk assessment on SCADA systems.”  Participant “B” suggested “that industry and consultants require a 
framework to assess SCADA security risks.” Also, the participant suggested that they had “not seen a framework 
that specifically addressed SCADA security risks.” The comments from participant “B” once again reinforce the 
frameworks’ originality, significance and overall contribution to knowledge and the SCADA community.  
 
Participant “B” also argued that an “issue faced in using this framework may be the creditability of assessing outside 
organisations’ ability to measure the cyber-capability of terrorist groups.” However the participant agreed that if 
TISN or a trusted government security agency could be used to assess the cyber-capability of terrorist groups that 
“this would contribute to the overall creditability.” The present authors explained that this was included as a 
suggested procedure and guideline in the model and that creditability could be overcome by a trusted source such as 
TISN or ASIO. This once again reiterates the significance of having a cyber-terrorism steering group in order to 
assess and estimate scores within the cyber-terrorism SCADA capability assessment model.  
 
Likewise, Participant “C” claimed that there may “be implications when implementing the framework on rather 
large installations when selecting hardware and equipment that may not be installed until three years.” This 
participant suggested that capability of the “hardware may not be able to be updated in order to meet the growing 
threat level.” The present authors suggest that technology will constantly being changing and that updating and 
reviewing of the entire model at least every 6 months or accordingly to each organisation’s needs and requirement 
levels would assist in overcoming such problems. This suggests that the framework is adaptable to ongoing change 
and refinement and also demonstrates the model’s flexibility with each individual organisation, providing even 
further validation and acceptance.    
 
Also, Participant “D” suggested that there would be a “great deal of confidence in adopting the framework as there 
is no framework that exists” that addresses cyber-terrorism and SCADA risks. This participant believed that 
“educating users about the framework would be beneficial in the adoption process.” The present authors agree with 
the participant’s comments and suggest that the framework could be adopted relatively easily by educating SCADA 
engineers on the cyber-terrorism and SCADA risk process. Participant “D’s” comments once again demonstrate that 
the framework is useful and significant for SCADA engineers and SCADA asset owners. This overall adds value to 
the framework’s purpose, but more importantly to the overall research contribution.    
 
Furthermore, Participant “A” argued that the framework provides an “original process” and “that there is no 
framework that deals with this type of threat.” The participant claimed that the “framework demonstrated a 
“suggested process to mitigate risk.”  Participant “A” argued that once a “framework is launched then obviously 
through experience it builds.” This participant suggested that the framework was “brilliant” and that adopting the 
framework “looks at a process that could be put into place.”  Participant “A” said that a “framework in place such as 
this had not been done before.” Participant “A” argued that it’s “on the tips, tongues, minds and heart of the 
corporate world and government security agencies all over the world.” This participant believed that there was “a lot 
of merit” in the framework and its contribution. Also, the participant argued that it “provided a starting point that 
could be vertically integrated” into organisations. Likewise, “keeping it simple” was another suggested comment by 
Participant “A” who claimed that “government agencies are trying to get their head around the cyber-terrorism 
threat.” The present authors strongly agree with such comments made by Participant “A” and believe that the 
framework provides a systematic and fluid process that could be simply used and adopted by industry and 
government. Participant “A” said that the framework gives “SCADA engineers an understanding of what risk 
assessment processes there are for SCADA.” This ultimately again adds strong value to the overall validity, purpose 
and adoption phase of the framework within industry. Participant “A” also claimed that the framework is very useful 
as it gives “suggestion and viewpoints” and if the framework “could be rated out of 100 I would give it 500 as there 
is definitely merit in it.” The participant’s comments, reinforces the framework’s validity and significance within the 
SCADA community.    
 
Similarly, Participant “E” suggested that on “previous projects regarding SCADA security risk assessments they had 
never used a formal approach or framework in identify threats against SCADA.” After adopting and using the 
framework proposed this participant believed “that it was of great benefit as it identified gaps and security issues 
that were not previously recognised” in assessing SCADA threats such as cyber-terrorism. This participant firmly 
agreed that the “framework was of great value and benefit.” This highlights that the framework has subsequently 
been adopted on various projects within the SCADA “Tier 1 Top 5” engineering consulting company. This once 
again demonstrates the framework’s overall significance and purpose, and also reinforces the framework’s validity 
and industry acceptance and adoption.    
 
Likewise, Participant “C” reinforced the use and acceptance of the framework and said “that in terms of assets 
owners, they would use the framework in order to determine the risks they face from threats including cyber-
terrorism.” Participant “A” said that “SCADA asset owners would use the framework because the threat of cyber-
terrorism is evolving.” However the participant claimed that many SCADA asset owners are “not aware of the 
framework for cyber-terrorism because the concept is so new.” Participant “A” suggested that most “SCADA asset 
owners don’t even know what cyber-terrorism means” and that “they have not ventured into this area.” However, the 
participant suggested that “some major utilities companies are aware of this issue and would use the framework.” 
The participant argued “that it’s an education and culture process and that there are people screaming down the door 
for this type of thing.” Participant “A” said that the framework would “need to be engaged with SCADA engineers 
and that education would be required.”  
 
The present authors would like to acknowledge that the framework is actively being presented throughout industry 
which is providing the opportunity to educate SCADA engineers and SCADA asset owners of the threat of cyber-
terrorism against SCADA systems. It also is encouraging SCADA asset owners to adopt the framework in order to 
assess security threats such as cyber-terrorism.  Participant “A” also suggested that there was definitely a need for 
such a framework within corporate Australia.” The present authors agree with the comments suggested by 
Participant “A” indicate that the framework provides a major contribution to all SCADA engineers and consultants. 
He has also encouraged all members of the SCADA community to embrace and acknowledge the real dangers faced 
from cyber-terrorism and other associated security risks, when adopting the framework.   
 
On the other hand, there were some industry implications that were discussed within the focus group. Participant 
“D” claimed that “small organisations may not adopt the framework because it may be too costly to implement.” 
This participant suggested that “certain types of industries that use SCADA systems may not see any benefit.” For 
example, the participant suggested that organisations that “make plastic bottles using SCADA systems may not see 
any value any adopting the framework.” Participant “D” agreed that these types of organisations may not be a 
subjected to a terrorist attack such as cyber-terrorism.” Participant “C” also supported this comment by suggesting 
“that in some industries down time on SCADA systems and PLC’s is not as critical as in other sectors.” The present 
authors agree with both participants and suggest that the framework would be more suitable and appropriate for 
large organisations controlling critical infrastructure such as power, gas and water, etc. The present authors also 
agree that cost would be an implication for smaller organisations as they may not have the funding to carry out the 
SCADA risk process and the cyber-terrorism capability assessment model by funding and organising the cyber-
terrorism steering group. These issues and implications would only be applicable to certain types of organisations. 
As the majority of SCADA systems are controlled by very large critical infrastructure organisations and therefore 
the framework should be targeted towards these types of infrastructures.      
  
This is supported by Participant “B” who suggested that the “framework would be used in major process industries 
such as power, water oil and gas where any type of shut down is hugely costly.” This participant also suggested 
“that the framework would be useful at the board level as they would be interested in risks that would shut down 
processes within the plant.” The participant claimed that the framework “would support this as high risks could be 
identified” such as cyber-terrorism. Also, Participant “B” suggested the use of the “cyber-terrorism steering group” 
would be adopted if the organisations had the budget. This participant provided an example that “if cyber-terrorism 
was their number one risk”, that “his organisation would definitely go ahead with acquiring the resources through 
TISN, and ASIO in order to make an assessment for the cyber-terrorism SCADA capability model.” This once again 
demonstrates enormous value and significance for organisations to adopt the cyber-terrorism SCADA risk 
framework.     
 
The main implications identified from participants within the focus group in regards to industry adoption included: 
 Cost of implementing the framework;  
 Education and cultural issues need to be considered when implementing the framework;  
 Small organisations may not adopt the framework as it may not be suitable to their industry;  
 The framework needs to be industry specific and targeted to larger organisations.   
 
These implications would only be applicable to certain organisations and would not affect the overall purpose of the 
frameworks functionality usability and adoption within an industry based context.   
 
Lastly, the industry focus group provided positive feedback on how widely the framework would be adopted by 
industry SCADA professionals. The results and findings have demonstrated how organisations and SCADA 
practitioners would use the framework and also how important a framework such as the one presented is needed 
within industry.   
 
In summary, the main findings and results regarding the industry adoption phase of the model within industry has 
been identified by the focus group in order to provide final validation of the cyber-terrorism SCADA risk 
framework. Below is a summary of the results and findings: 
 There is no framework readily available that address cyber-terrorism and SCADA; 
 There is a great need within industry for a framework that deals with SCADA security threats such as 
cyber-terrorism; 
 The framework would be most suitable for large process control organisations that depend on criticality for 
their operations;  
 The framework maybe costly to implement for smaller organisations;  
 The framework has merit and is of great value and significance within the SCADA industry;  
 The framework would be widely accepted and used by many organisations that use SCADA systems.     
 
CONCLUSION   
This paper has presented a framework to measure and protect SCADA systems from the threat of cyber-terrorism 
within Australia which various experts from various industrial sectors have tested and validated as an effective 
means to identify Australian SCADA systems’ vulnerabilities, terrorist’ capabilities and the means to control factors 
to reduce terrorists’ possibilities for conducting successful attacks against these infrastructure assets.  
 
The industry focus group findings demonstrated how widely the framework would be used within industry and has 
suggested how significant and important the framework is needed within industry. The overall acceptance by 
industry once again provides the present authors and the research community with a framework that is highly 
regarded and valuable to all SCADA practitioners. These results and outcomes have assisted in addressing how to 
measure and protect SCADA systems from cyber-terrorist threats. The research developed is of great significance 
and value to the SCADA security community and to organisations that are controlling SCADA systems within 
Australia. The research has provided organisations with a methodology to measure and to protect against the threat 
of cyber-terrorism, but more importantly, has demonstrated the need for new counter-terrorism security models to 
assist with assessing new cyber security threats such as cyber-terrorism. 
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Gazprom Case 1999  
In 1999, hackers broke into Gazprom a gas company in Russia. The attack was collaborated with a Gazprom insider. 
The hackers were said to have used a Trojan horse to gain control of the central switchboard which controls gas 
flows in pipelines, although Gazprom, the world's largest natural gas producer and the largest gas supplier to 
Western Europe, refuted the report (Denning 2000).  
 
Queensland Case 2000 
In 2000, in Queensland Australia, a 49 year old man, Vitek Boden hacked into an industrial control system using the 
Internet, a wireless radio and stolen control software and consequently managed to release millions of litres of 
sewage into the river and coastal waters of Maroochydore in Queensland, Australia (Lemos, 2002). After resigning 
from his position at Hunter Watertech and later being refused a new position with Maroochy Water Services, he 
began a sabotage campaign against the sewerage management system and made 46 intrusions. Each time he gained 
access to the system, the laptop assumed the functions of a pumping station and was able to access the nodes 
governing the control of the sewerage system operations.  As a result, marine life died, the creek water turned black 
and the stench was unbearable for residents. The unauthorised intrusions costs $13,000 in clean up and $176,000 in 
extra monitoring and security of the system, also, the incident resulted in an extensive and costly in-house 
investigation and media activity and a loss of Maroochy Water Services’ reputation over a five month period (IT 
Security Expert Advisory Group, 2005).   
 
SQL Slammer Case 2003  
In January 2003, an Internet based worm called SQL Slammer was released. Slammer generated considerable 
network traffic denying service to all other network users. Slammer exploited the vulnerability in a Microsoft 
database product. The SCADA system that utilised this product was potentially vulnerable to the worm. At the 
Davis Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio, worm activity on the Process Control Network blocked SCADA traffic 
causing the operators to lose some degree of control of the system. As a consequence, the plant’s Safety Parameter 
Display System and Plant Process Computer was disabled for four hours, fifty minutes and six hours and nine 
minutes respectively (IT Security Expert Advisory Group, 2005).   
 
Estonia 2007 
In April 2007 the Russians attacked Estonia computer infrastructure forcing many websites to shut down which 
inflicted huge losses to Estonia’s economy. According to the New York Times the assault of Estonia’s virtual 
society began after Estonian authorities moved a statue of a Soviet soldier from a central park in Tallinn to a military 
graveyard further from the centre city. For many Estonians, the statue was another reminder of Soviet invaders who 
took their homes at Stalin’s orders. Russians and Estonians of Russian descent immediately took the streets 
protesting. Removing the statue was a sign of disrespect for Soviets who battled the Nazis in World War II. Shortly 
after the protest, waves of unwanted data quickly clogged the Web sites of the government, business, banks and 
several newspapers, shutting down one branch of their computer network after another. The attacks lasted for over a 
month and caused major disruption and loss to Estonia’s economy (New York Times, 2007). These attacks 
demonstrate the impact of information warfare between two nation states. Although these attacks were politically 
motivated, the attacks did involve one state attacking another in a warfare scenario as well as causing minimal fear 
or harm to anyone and therefore cannot be classified or labelled as cyber-terrorism.      
 
Polish Trams 2008  
In 2008 a teenage boy hacked into a Polish tram system and used it like “a giant train set, causing chaos and 
derailing four vehicles. The 14-year-old, described by his teachers as a model pupil and an electronics “genius,” 
adapted a television remote control so it could change track points in the city of Lodz. Twelve people were injured 
in one derailment, and the boy is suspected of having been involved in several similar incidents (Telegraph, 2008). 
Such cases demonstrate the capability for individuals to carry out such attacks although this case did not 
demonstrate signs of political motivation, it does sever to highlight the possibility of cyber-terrorism occurring.  
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